There is a particular kind of investor who appears when industries are distressed, unfashionable or structurally misunderstood. Soo Kim belongs in that tradition.
The South Korea-born, Queens-raised hedge fund manager built his reputation through Standard General, the investment firm that specialised in troubled assets others considered too indebted, politically difficult or operationally messy. Critics called him opportunistic. Admirers called him disciplined.
Now Kim, who is also the chairman for Bally’s Corporation, is attempting something more ambitious: the construction of a transatlantic gambling group assembled through debt, distressed assets and strategic patience. Nowhere is that ambition more visible than in Britain.
The proposed acquisition of Evoke plc – owner of William Hill, 888 and Mr Green – by Bally’s Intralot would create one of the UK’s largest online gambling operators. Yet industry chatter suggests Evoke may not be the company’s only target. According to a recent addition of Scott Longley’s Earnings+More newsletter, Bally’s Intralot is also exploring a potential bid for LiveScore Group, the media-to-betting operator behind LiveScore Bet and Virgin Bet.
At first glance, the logic appears contradictory. Why pursue another UK-facing betting brand while attempting to absorb William Hill and 888? But the answer may reveal Kim’s broader strategy for Europe.
A company assembled from fragments
Kim does not build businesses conventionally. He accumulates pieces. Under his leadership, Bally’s has transformed into a sprawling gaming conglomerate spanning casinos, lotteries, online gaming and media-adjacent betting assets. It operates nearly 20 casinos, has established Bally’s Interactive, owns a UK casino at Aspers Newcastle, has become the largest shareholder in The Star Entertainment Group and is developing casino projects in Chicago, Las Vegas and New York.
Speaking recently to iGB’s sister publication GGB Magazine, Kim described Bally’s ambition in expansive terms: “We believe in gaming in all its forms, and maybe our ambition is to become the first truly global gaming company.”
Britain matters because it offers something increasingly rare in gambling: scale, liquidity, regulatory maturity and operational expertise. While many operators now view the UK as overtaxed and overregulated, Kim appears to see consolidation opportunity.
During his keynote appearance at ICE earlier this year, Kim argued that higher taxes and tighter regulation could ultimately reduce competition by squeezing smaller operators out of the market. Bally’s appears to believe that while tougher regulation may hurt weaker companies, it could strengthen larger operators with the scale and resources to absorb the pressure.
Bally’s play for LiveScore Group
Chad Beynon, head of US research and sell-side equity analyst at Macquarie Capital, sees the same trend emerging across the UK market. “In the UK, we’ve seen outsized benefits, particularly with FLUT [Flutter Entertainment], from their multi-brand strategy,” Beynon says. “Globally, customers have discerning tastes, especially for iGaming, compared to online sports betting.”
He argues Bally’s’ continued focus on Britain reflects the resilience and strategic value of its UK-facing operations, despite mounting regulatory pressure. “The UK business has been quite resilient and management’s focus and attention towards that market highlights that there could be additional interest and synergies there,” he says.
Beynon also believes Britain’s post-tax hike environment increasingly favours scale. “In the early days post-iGaming tax changes, we’re seeing the stronger companies surviving and some of the smaller companies languishing, without a white knight,” he says. “Being part of a bigger organisation with shared corporate costs would help companies navigate through this tax adjustment.”
Ben Robinson, managing partner at Corfai, believes that logic explains Bally’s interest in LiveScore. “William Hill is the mass-market sportsbook with a retail backbone,” Robinson says. “LiveScore Bet sits behind a 100 million-user media front end which is the only owned acquisition funnel at that scale in iGaming.”
“The real prize is the media asset,” he adds. “Under a 40% RGD the biggest variable in UK unit economics is customer acquisition cost.”
That observation goes to the centre of Bally’s apparent thinking. In an era of rising taxes and escalating acquisition costs, operators with proprietary media funnels possess a structural advantage. LiveScore’s audience potentially offers Bally’s a cheaper route to customer acquisition than traditional affiliate or television marketing models.
Robinson also argues LiveScore’s partnership with X and xAI could become strategically valuable through “real-time trading models, personalisation and betting flow piped straight into X”. In that context, LiveScore is less a sportsbook acquisition than a data and audience acquisition.
The Bally’s debt question
Bally’s appetite for deals has created mounting scepticism about how the company can finance them all. The proposed Evoke transaction alone is formidable: Evoke carries roughly £1.86 billion in debt. Bally’s Intralot already has substantial leverage. Add a potential £500 million LiveScore acquisition and the financing burden becomes immense.
Robinson estimates that a combined Bally’s Intralot and Evoke entity “would carry around £3.3 billion of debt against roughly £730 million of EBITDA”. Adding LiveScore would likely push total refinancing needs towards £4 billion. “The all-share component of the Evoke approach is the tell that cash is already scarce,” Robinson says.
Indeed, Evoke confirmed in May that discussions with Bally’s Intralot were continuing and that the deadline for a firm offer had been extended until 8 June. Any proposal would likely consist of “an all-share combination with a partial cash alternative”. That wording suggests Bally’s is trying to preserve liquidity while relying on future synergies and refinancing capacity, experts note.
Beynon argues Bally’s ability to continue pursuing expansion despite elevated leverage reflects a management team that has remained flexible in accessing capital markets. “From a capital allocation standpoint, the company continues to be nimble with the markets with respect to raising capital, primarily through sale-lease back deals on their retail business, but also recently with their Intralot transaction,” he says.
Considerable scepticism
While acknowledging Bally’s debt levels remains high, Beynon believes management has so far navigated the company’s funding pressures effectively. “Financial leverage for the company remains high, as do their aspirations for further growth, but management has been able to successfully navigate the funding situation during the last few years,” he says.
Others are considerably more sceptical. “I’m not sure anyone understands – including leadership – the strategy of Bally’s,” says Brendan Bussmann, managing partner at B Global. “You continue to see significant M&A activity that has become a collection of toys but no full alignment.”
He argues Bally’s increasingly resembles a company attempting to build multiple mega-projects simultaneously while lacking the balance sheet strength traditionally associated with such ambitions. “Apparently Mr. Kim has found the proverbial money tree because at some point, the music has to stop,” Bussmann says.
Those concerns are not theoretical. Bally’s temporary Chicago casino has underperformed expectations, while its Las Vegas development remains phased and cautious. Kim himself acknowledged that caution recently, saying: “We’re not in a position to spend $5 or $6 billion all at once – and, even if we had it, I’m not sure we would.”
That comment perhaps reveals something important about Kim’s operating philosophy. Assets are built step by step, financed creatively and monetised over long-term horizons. Or, as Kim put it when he spoke to GGB Magazine recently: “I’ve made a living cleaning up after other people’s mistakes.”
Britain as consolidation play
So why pursue Britain so aggressively while others pull back? Partly because that retreat creates opportunity. Flutter already has scale. Entain remains distracted by governance and regulatory pressure. Smaller operators are struggling with Britain’s increasingly tough tax and compliance environment.
Bally’s appears to believe there is space for a new scaled challenger built through consolidation. Robinson sees the strategy as fundamentally economic. “The same tax wave pushing mid-tier operators out creates room for one or two scaled consolidators to dominate,” he says. “The operator with the lowest acquisition cost and the largest base to absorb the duty hit wins disproportionately.”
That may explain why Kim remains optimistic while others are growing more cautious. It also explains Bally’s preference for assets that initially appear messy. William Hill, 888, Gamesys, Intralot, Star Entertainment and potentially LiveScore all come with operational, financial or reputational complications that have deterred cleaner bidders. Kim appears unusually comfortable operating inside complexity.
A Forbes profile portrayed him as a financier attracted to industries where politics, regulation and stigma suppress valuations. Gambling fits naturally into that worldview. And with regards to Bally’s expansion, it is noticeable how Kim increasingly speaks less like a hedge fund activist and more like a long-term operator focused on building a globally diversified gaming platform.
What is the endgame?
The obvious question is whether there is a coherent endpoint to all this accumulation. Bussmann doubts it. “Looking at different assets that do not always look like they fit in the tool shed seems to be more of the norm than the outlier,” he says.
Yet there may be more coherence than first appears. A combined Bally’s-Evoke-LiveScore structure would potentially leave Bally’s controlling one of the UK’s largest online gambling operators while simultaneously owning a powerful proprietary sports media funnel capable of lowering acquisition costs across multiple brands.
Robinson believes the destination is ultimately strategic rather than operational. “The likely strategic destination is to be the dominant UK online operator with a scaled European platform behind it, then either re-rate as a standalone or sell to a US strategic,” he says. That would align closely with Kim’s broader history. Standard General has rarely been ideological about ownership duration. Assets are assembled, stabilised, repriced and eventually monetised.
But the risk of failure is still high. Bally’s is managing resort projects, restructuring in Australia, refinancing pressures and aggressive deal-making all at the same time in one of the world’s most heavily regulated markets.
And yet Kim keeps buying. “We believe in gaming in all its forms,” he said recently. It may be a sign that Bally’s’ European ambitions are only beginning.
Bally’s declined to comment for this article.
Original article: https://igamingbusiness.com/strategy/ma/soo-kim-uk-gamble-what-does-ballys-want/
